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IntroductIon
Is there reason to add to the proliferating set of estimates on 
the  extent  of  renminbi  undervaluation  (see  among  others, 
Bergsten 2010; Cline and Williamson 2008 and 2010; Gold-
stein and Lardy 2008 and 2009; Frankel 2008; Reisen 2009; 
and Lee et al. 2008)? Yes, not least because these new estimates:   
(1)  suggest  that  purchasing  power  parity  (PPP)-based 
approaches  to  measuring  renminbi  undervaluation  suggest 
that  China’s  currency  is  undervalued  by  about  30  percent 
against the dollar and not the 12 percent recently reported 
(Bajaj 2010); and (2) are closer to and consistent with alterna-
tive approaches to estimating renminbi undervaluation.
Treasury Secretary Geithner has just announced that he 
will delay publication of the report to Congress on the inter-
national economic and exchange rate policies of the Chinese 
currency.  He  has  decided  to  postpone  until  the  summer 
the decision on whether he should brand China a currency 
manipulator. By the summer, a series of meetings will have 
taken place, including a surprise one with Chinese leaders on 
April 8, a meeting of G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China 
in May, and the G-20 Finance Ministers and Leaders meet-
ings in June 2010. Clearly, there have been some short-term 
understandings between the two countries but, until there is a 
significant and consistently upward move in the renminbi, the 
issue is unlikely to be fully resolved. Thus, the search for better 
estimates on currency misalignment needs to continue.
But there are also other substantive reasons for continuing 
this search. First, new data from the International Comparison 
Project (ICP) have become available that have been reflected 
in new estimates published in the World Development Indica-
tors (WDI) by the World Bank in 2008 for GDP per capita 
adjusted for PPP. These estimates have attracted great contro-
versy because of the large downward revisions in the living 
standards for China and India in particular. The controversy 
has been greatest in relation to measurements of world poverty 
necessitating new poverty estimates (see Chen and Ravallion 
2008). 
But the implications of this controversy have not been 
adequately recognized for PPP-based measurements of under-
valuation of currencies. For example, on April 2, the New York 
Times (Bajaj 2010) reported, based on Reisen (2009), that 
PPP-based approaches yield an undervaluation of the Chinese 
currency of “only” 12 percent. As I show below: when the 
PPP approach is correctly applied, this figure turns out to be a 
serious underestimate. 
Second, a new version of the Penn World Tables (PWT, 
version 6.3) has recently become available, which can also be 
used for reestimating PPP-based currency misalignment. 
Finally, the need for redoing current estimates is called 
for in light of a new National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) working paper (Johnson, Larson, Papageorgiou and 
Subramanian, 2009 [hereafter JLPS]). In that paper, we showed 
that there was a problem of valuation in the Penn World Tables 
that leads to considerable variability—across PWT versions and 
across time—in the estimates of PPP-based measures of income 
per capita and in the price level of GDP (which is the PWT’s 
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variant of the real exchange rate). One implication is that it is 
not in general robust to use data from the PWT or the WDI for 
years other than the benchmark year for which detailed price 
data are collected; also, in general it is better to restrict data 
to countries for which detailed price data have been collected 
(benchmark countries). Hence, existing estimates of PPP-based 
undervaluation of the renminbi (Rodrik 2008 and Reisen 2009 
among others) need to be redone. 
The result of doing so yields a simple conclusion: In 2005 
I find that the average estimate of renminbi undervaluation 
(against  the  US  dollar)  is  about  30  percent;  updating  this 
estimate for end-March 2010, using the same methodology, 
leaves that estimate broadly unchanged at 30 percent. In other 
words, as of this writing, PPP-based approaches to measuring 
China’s undervaluation suggest that the renminbi is under-
valued by about 30 percent against the dollar and not the 12 
percent recently reported. 
Background and Methodology
Estimates  of  currency  undervaluation  and  overvaluation 
are based on two broad categories of models. The first are 
macroeconomic  models,  using  notions  of  external  balance, 
savings and investment behavior, etc. to define an equilib-
rium exchange rate.1 Limiting the current account or ensur-
ing  sustainable  net  external  indebtedness  are  key  variables 
in pinning down this equilibrium exchange rate. Departures 
from this equilibrium rate yield estimates of undervaluation 
and overvaluation. The latest estimates by Cline and William-
son (2010) and Goldstein and Lardy (2009) suggest renminbi 
undervaluation of between 15 and 30 percent against a basket 
1. John Williamson (1983) propounded the notion of a fundamental equilib-
rium exchange rate (FEER), which is the basis for more recent estimates by 
Cline and Williamson (2008). These estimates are done country by country. In 
contrast, the IMF has a multicountry general equilibrium model that relies on 
an expanded set of macroeconomic variables (including, for example, demo-
graphic variables) and ensures consistency in the estimates across countries (see 
Lee et al. 2008).
of currencies. It must be noted that these estimates are sensi-
tive to projections for China’s current account surplus, which 
are being revised downward in response to the large actual 
decline in this surplus in 2009 and 2010 in the wake of the 
financial crisis. 
A  second  basis  for  estimating  currency  disequilibrium 
stems from a longer, development perspective. The work of 
Balassa and Samuelson (hereafter BS) suggested that as coun-
tries grow over time, their real exchange rates should appreci-
ate—reflecting productivity growth, particularly in the trad-
able goods sector. That is: As poor countries grow, the labor 
productivity of their traded-goods sector will tend to rise, spill-
ing over to wages and prices in producing nontraded goods, 
and so their price structures should become more like those of 
developed countries. Thus a rising price—or an appreciating 
currency—is an equilibrium phenomenon. 
Departures from this equilibrium relationship suggested 
by BS then provide the basis for calculating undervaluation 
and overvaluation of currencies.2 In the Penn World Tables—
whose raison d’être is the BS relationship—the real exchange 
rate (strictly speaking its inverse) is captured as the ratio of the 
purchasing power parity exchange rate to the market exchange 
rate. For example, in the case of India, the PPP exchange rate 
in 2005 was estimated at 14.7 rupees to the dollar compared 
with the market exchange rate of 44.1 rupees to the dollar. 
This yields a price level of GDP in India relative to the United 
States of 0.33 (14.7/44.1), suggesting that Indian prices are, 
on average, one-third of those in the United States. 
Both approaches have their advocates and critics. This is 
not the place to debate their relative merits (see Cline and 
Williamson 2008, and Frankel 2008 for an excellent exchange). 
What can be safely said is: (1) that the two approaches are 
complementary,  deploying  different  time  perspectives  for 
analyzing currency misalignment; and (2) that the more they 
provide estimates that are correlated, the greater the degree of 
confidence that one can have in either. 
There is, however, one aspect of the PPP-based approach 
that is inadequately appreciated. Like the IMF’s Consultative 
Group  on  Exchange  Rate  Issues  (CGER)  model  described 
in Lee et al. (2008) and unlike the approach in Cline and 
Williamson (2008), PPP-based approaches have the virtue of 
being general equilibrium in nature in the sense that all coun-
tries’ equilibrium exchange rates are determined simultane-
ously, ensuring some degree of consistency across estimates for 
countries (for example, not all countries can simultaneously 
have undervalued or overvalued exchange rates).3  
2. Rogoff (1996) was an early example of using the Penn World Tables to 
measure currency misalignment.
3. The simultaneous determination of equilibrium exchange rates across 
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Thus, the BS relationship is captured in the following 
equation:
Ln Pi = α + β Ln Yi            (1)
where Pi is the price level of GDP (ratio of the PPP to market 
exchange rates) for country i, Yi is its GDP per capita in PPP 
terms, and β measures the equilibrium impact of economic 
growth on the real exchange rate.
After estimating equation 1, the predicted value of the real 
exchange rate for each country Pi* can be obtained. The differ-
ence between the actual real exchange rate and the predicted 
one is then a measure of currency misalignment on the PPP 
approach:
Thus UVALi = Ln Pi* - Ln Pi         (2)
where  UVALi is  the  measure  of  undervaluation  of  country 
i’s currency (i.e., a positive value of UVALi when a country’s 
actual price level of GDP is lower than what is predicted by 
the BS relationship implies that its real exchange rate is under-
valued).
EstimatEs for China
The analysis in JLPS (2009) suggests that BS relationship in 
equation 1 is best estimated: (1) for the benchmark year for 
which the most recent disaggregated price data are collected; 
and (2) that the estimation is also best restricted to the sample 
of countries (benchmark countries) for which disaggregated 
price data exist. Now, the most recent disaggregated price data 
were collected for the year 2005 and have been incorporated 
in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators’ (WDI) 
estimates for Y and P in equation 1 above.
Estimation of equation 1 using these data for benchmark 
countries yields a figure of 15 percent for China’s undervalua-
tion for 2005. The estimated equation with relevant statistical 
descriptors is reproduced in column 1 of table 1. 
At first blush, this is very close to Reisen’s estimate of 12 
percent reported in the New York Times. The problem with this 
estimate is that it is based on data for China (and India) that 
have been seriously questioned. Deaton and Heston (2009), 
perhaps amongst the most thoughtful and careful analysts of 
countries arises from the way disaggregated price data from different countries 
are aggregated to yield the international prices for all goods across countries 
(see JLPS 2009, appendix 1 for a description and Deaton and Heston 2009 
for some of the problems and complexities in such an aggregation).
. Technically speaking, JLPS (2009) implies that estimating equation 1 
would be problematic because of errors in measuring both the left-hand and 
right-hand variables. These errors are not random but in fact systematic across 
time and across countries, leading to biased and inconsistent estimates of the 
parameters in equation 1.
these new data, have suggested that the price level of GDP for 
China has been overestimated by about 20 percent and its per 
capita PPP GDP underestimated by about that amount. 
Their critique is twofold. First, they point to the fact that the 
disaggregated prices collected for China as part of the 2005 ICP 
project were predominantly for urban areas, which imparted a 
serious upward bias to Chinese prices.5 Second, they argue (and 
here they echo the point also made by Bhalla 2008), based on 
the work of Pritchett (1997), that the new per capita GDP esti-
mates for 2005 combined with the growth rate (of 5.5 percent) 
of the Chinese economy for the period 1952–200 would yield 
a per capita GDP estimate for 1952 that would be well below 
the minimum level of per capita GDP that history suggests is 
required to sustain a population, or that has ever been observed 
for more than a short period. The only way historical growth 
rates can be reconciled with above-subsistence levels of income 
in 1952 would be to raise the GDP estimate for 2005 by about 
20 percent. This, in turn, would require the price level or the 
real exchange rate also to be raised by about 20 percent.
If this critique by Deaton and Heston (2009) is accepted, 
and equation 1 is reestimated adjusting P and Y for China 
by, say, 10 and 20 percent (to cover the range of possible bias 
identified by Deaton and Heston 2009), respectively, the new 
estimates for Chinese undervaluation change significantly. In 
column 2 of table 1, estimates are reported when a 10 percent 
adjustment is made and in column 3 when a 20 percent adjust-
ment is made. With these corrections, Chinese undervalua-
tion rises to 2 percent and 37 percent, respectively (figure 1 
plots the relationship corresponding to the 20 percent adjust-
ment). 
One way of checking which of these estimates of under-
valuation is plausible is in fact to estimate equation 1 based 
on the most recent version of the PWT, namely version .3, 
which was released in August 2009. The disadvantage of using 
these data is that they are prone to the problems described 
in JLPS (2009). The advantage of using these is that they are 
perhaps less prone to the bias in estimating price level and 
GDP associated with the estimates in the WDI that afflict, in 
particular, countries such as China. These caveats need to be 
borne in mind when evaluating estimates from this source.
When equation 1 is reestimated using PWT .3 data, the 
undervaluation estimate for China is 7 percent as reported in 
column  of table 1. 
5. Ravallion (2010) suggests that China’s price level was overstated in the 2005 
ICP by about a third because of the urban bias of data collection.
. In principle, changing individual Chinese prices would affect all the inter-
national prices and the PPPs for all countries, but as an approximation, and 
given China’s relatively small size in world consumption, these consequential 
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All these estimates are for 2005. But they can be updated 
for the most recent period (say end-March 2010) by using 
the estimated β to project how the real exchange rate should 
have evolved between end-2005 and today. This can then be 
compared  with  how  much  the  renminbi  actually  evolved, 
obtain the difference between the two, and adjust the 2005 
estimate accordingly. 
Between 2005 and end-March 2010, China’s per capita 
GDP grew about 45 percent; applying the average of the four 
β estimates suggests that the real exchange rate should have 
appreciated by a further 12 percent. The actual real appre-
ciation of the renminbi was about the same measured both 
against the dollar and against a basket of goods (based on the 
real exchange rate indices produced by JPMorgan, Citi, and 
the Bank for International Settlements [BIS]), suggesting that 
the estimate for 2005 from the equation is broadly also the 
undervaluation estimate for today. 
Since each of the four estimates suffers from limitations, a 
reasonable approach would be to average all four. This yields an 
undervaluation estimate for China of about 31 percent against 
the US dollar, which is my preferred PPP-based estimate.7 
Way forWard
If this estimate (which is quantitatively similar to the esti-
mates of other methods) is right, the policy question of how 
7. The magnitude of undervaluation is also statistically significant: when a 
China dummy is introduced in the regression in equation 1, its coefficient is 
tightly estimated and significant at the 1 percent confidence level. 
to address renminbi undervaluation remains alive and urgent. 
Many  analysts  argue  that  renminbi  appreciation  would  be 
desirable  because  that  would  be  in  China’s  own  interests. 
There is no doubt that China’s currency policy threatens to 
create a number of distortions for China, including an over-
reliance on foreign as opposed to domestic demand, a reserve 
buildup with large potential valuation losses in the future, and 
the continuation of financial repression that current currency 
policy requires and sustains. 
It is one thing for outsiders to warn of these potential 
dangers.  But  it  is  something  else  to  confidently  assert  that 
changing the current policy would be better for China. It is not 
just that the call to change policies ignores the wrenching social 
and political change that governments have to deal with and 
that governments around the world naturally shy away from. 
Humility is in order when telling a country that has posted 
the most spectacular rates of economic growth for the longest 
periods of time in the history of humanity that other policies 
would have worked better. It must be pointed out that the most 
spectacular rates of economic growth have also been accompa-
nied by the most spectacular rates of growth of consumption 
per capita. So, while it is possible (but by no means certain) that 
the Chinese government might be sacrificing consumption for 
extra growth in counterfactual time; it is certainly delivering 
rapid growth rates of consumption in real time.
So, the more justified case for a change in China’s currency 
policy is the impact not on China itself but on the rest of the 
world. Two aspects of this impact are worth emphasizing. First, 
in a cyclical sense, China’s current account surplus (reflect-
ing its currency undervaluation) creates a demand problem. 
Table 1     PPP-based estimates of renminbi undervaluation
Data set
World Development 
Indicators (WDI)  
WDI with China data 
corrected á la Deaton 
and Heston (2009)1    
WDI with China data 
corrected á la Deaton 
and Heston (2009)2   
Penn World Tables 
(version 6.3)                 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable is log of the price level of GDP in 2005
Coefficient on constant term 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.7
t-statistic 11.6 11. 11.1 .17
Coefficient on log of per capita GDP (PPP) 0. 0. 0. 0.51
t-statistic 11.8 11.8 11.81 10.0
R-square 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.6
Number of observations 11 11 11 1
Magnitude of of undervaluation (percent) 1.50 6.0 6.90 7.0
Average magnitude of undervaluation  
   (percent)
1.0
1. China’s price level is decreased by 10 percent and GDP per capita increased by 10 percent.
. China’s price level is decreased by 0 percent and GDP per capita increased by 0 percent.
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Paul Krugman has estimated that this demand-contractionary 
impact of China’s policies implies higher unemployment in 
the United States of about 1.7 million. Bergsten (2010) esti-
mates this impact as closer to 600,000.
Second,  as  argued  in  Subramanian  (2010),  an  under-
valued exchange rate is above all a protectionist trade policy 
because it is the combination of an import tariff and an export 
subsidy. It follows therefore that the real victims of this policy 
are other emerging-market and developing countries—because 
they compete more closely with China than the United States 
and Europe, whose source of comparative advantage is very 
different from China’s. In fact, developing countries face two 
distinct costs from China’s exchange rate policy.
In the short run, with capital pouring into emerging-
market countries, their ability to respond to the threat of asset 
bubbles  and  overheating  is  undermined.  Emerging-market 
countries such as Brazil, India, and South Korea are loath to 
allow  their  currencies  to  appreciate—to  dampen  overheat-
ing—when that of a major trade rival is pegged to the dollar.
But the more serious and long-term cost is the loss in trade 
and growth in poorer parts of the world. Dani Rodrik (2010) 
estimates that China’s undervaluation has boosted its long-run 
growth rate by more than 2 percent by allowing greater output 
of tradable goods, a sector that was the engine of growth and 
an escape route from underdevelopment for postwar successes 
such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
Higher  tradable  goods  production  in  China  results  in 
lower traded goods production elsewhere in the developing 
world, entailing a growth cost for these countries. Of course, 
some of these costs may have been alleviated by China’s rapid 
growth and the attendant demand for other countries’ goods. 
But China’s large current account surpluses suggest that the 
alleviation is only partial.
The key therefore is to recognize that the renminbi is a 
problem not just for the United States but the world and, as 
such, requires a multilateral rules-based solution rather than a 
bilateral confrontation between Washington and Beijing. The 
US Treasury secretary’s recent decision to defer pronouncing 
on China’s exchange rate as well as the manner in which this 
delay was presented are clearly aimed at multilateralizing the 
China currency issue. This is a very desirable step forward. The 
question is: What form should this multilateralization take?
Figure 1     The Balassa-Samuelson relationship, 2005
Log of PPP-adjusted per capita GDP (residuals)
coef = .66, (robust) se = .0197886, t = 11.81







  –  –  –1  0  1  
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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is, of course, the 
natural multilateral forum for addressing exchange rate issues. 
But the IMF suffers from problems of eroding legitimacy and 
inadequate leverage. Emerging market countries still complain 
that  its  antiquated  governance  structure  does  not  reflect 
economic realities. 
Moreover, the IMF has rarely, if ever, effectively influenced 
the policies of large creditor countries even where such policies 
have had significant negative effects on others. The IMF and its 
managing director have become more vocal in characterizing the 
renminbi as “substantially undervalued,” but this has been water 
off the Beijing duck’s back. The IMF is, sad to say, toothless.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a natural forum for 
developing new multilateral rules. First, undervalued exchange 
rates are de facto protectionist trade policies because they are a 
combination of export subsidies and import tariffs. Second, the 
WTO has a better record on enforcement of rules. Its dispute 
settlement system, although not perfect, has been reasonably 
effective in allowing members to initiate and settle disputes. The 
WTO has greater legitimacy than the IMF—developing coun-
tries, even smaller ones, have been active in bringing disputes 
to the WTO. Tiny Antigua (population: 69,000) managed to 
successfully challenge US gambling laws through the WTO.
Although the WTO has some rules on exchange rate–related 
action, they are too vague to provide a basis for effective enforce-
ment. What is needed is a new rule in the WTO proscribing 
undervalued exchange rates.8 The irony is that export subsidies 
and import tariffs are individually disciplined in the WTO, but 
their lethal combination, “an undervalued exchange rate,” is 
not. But the rules would have to be carefully designed because 
a competitive exchange rate can be a legitimate policy tool for 
development. The rules should aim to address those situations 
where the adverse costs imposed on partner countries from an 
undervalued exchange rate start to become large relative to the 
benefits to the country (Mattoo and Subramanian 2009 elabo-
rate on the content and implementation of possible new rules).
The IMF would continue to be the sole forum for broad 
8. Bergsten (2010) calls upon the United States to take China to the WTO 
based on possible violation of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) article XV:4.
exchange rate surveillance. But in those rare instances of substan-
tial and persistent undervaluation, we envisage a more effective 
delineation of responsibility, with the IMF continuing to play 
a technical role in assessing when a country’s exchange rate was 
undervalued, and the WTO assuming the enforcement role.
How would this new rule be incorporated in the WTO? 
Essentially through negotiation. For example, the G-20 over 
the next few months could examine the Chinese issue and call 
upon countries to indeed negotiate such new rules in the WTO. 
China would have to agree with its other trading partners in the 
WTO to negotiate new rules aimed at disciplining undervalued 
exchange rates. 
Such an approach has several advantages. China would not 
be seen as a victim of bilateral targeting, but part of a coopera-
tive approach to settle an issue that could well go beyond its 
currency. The remedy would be new broad-based rules rather 
than just renminbi revaluation. There would be a large collateral 
benefit too. Negotiating new and important rules would help 
revitalize the WTO, which has languished because of the unfin-
ished Doha Round of trade talks. 
conclusIon 
New estimates for the undervaluation of the Chinese currency 
based on the purchasing power parity approach yield a figure 
that is closer to 30 percent rather than the 12 percent reported 
recently in Reisen (2009) and in the New York Times. These esti-
mates—all of which come with qualifications and caveats—are 
based on applying new insights about the way in which the PPP 
data are compiled; on using new data that have become recently 
available; and on correcting existing estimates for the biases in 
the data used for China in particular.
The  best  PPP-based  estimate  for  renminbi  undervalu-
ation is one that can combine the methodology suggested by 
JLPS (2009) with data that corrects for the biases in the 2005 
ICP project. It will be possible to undertake such an estimate 
when version 7 of the Penn World Tables—which will correct 
for some of the biases in the 2005 ICP data and hence in the 
World Bank’s WDI PPP estimates—is released later this year. 
But for now, the best (or at least the least problematic) PPP-
based  estimate  for  renminbi  undervaluation  remains  about   
30 percent.
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